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WHAT EVERY GRAMMAR DOES: A REPLY TO PROF. ARBINI 
STEPHEN P. STICH 
Prof. Arbini's at tention is flattering; his conclusions rather 
less so. The issues over which Arbini and I divide are many. 
Yet fundamentally,  ! think, our differences may be traced to 
disagreement about  the nature and promise of  the theories 
produced by contemporary  generative grammarians. It  is here 
that I shall focus my attention. Some of the points at which 
Arbini aims his criticism are quite crucial if we are to 
appreciate what sort of  theory a grammar is. At other points 
his critique can best be viewed as the product  of  misunder- 
standing or polemical exuberance. 
The first of  the five sections that  follow is aimed at 
setting to rest one such misunderstanding, provoked by my 
remark that  a grammar commonly  entails infinitely many 
statements of  the form: S is a grammatical sentence. '  On my 
critic's reading, this portends an heretical doctrine which 
would deprive grammars of the most  basic empirical test 
against a native speaker's intuitions. The intended reading, by 
contrast, is the very soul of  or thodoxy.  
The section that follows attends to this basic empirical 
test in more detail. While Arbini and I agree that intuitions 
play a crucial role in the empirical confirmation of  a 
grammar, he would have grammaticality be no more than 
accord with intuitions. On my view, grammaticality cannot be 
explained so simply. Recourse to the notion of  a correct 
grammar is required. I f  I am right, then the paradox I 
proposed about  the nature of  linguistic intuitions survives 
Arbini's a t tempt  to scuttle it. 
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The concern in m y  third section is with what a grammar 
doesn't do. On my account, the rules of a grammar will not 
tell us how to recognize a grammatical sentence, nor how to 
produce the passive of  a given active. Arbini sees a mystery 
here. But the mystery disolves if we attend carefully to what 
a grammar tells us and what it does not. 
The fourth section resumes the topic of  evidence for 
grammars. Though we agree that intuitions are important data 
for the grammarian, Arbini holds that the most striking aspect 
of  the grammarian's data is the speakers' ability to produce 
the indefinitely many sentences of his language. The view is a 
common one and leads to much mischief. For besides painting 
a faulty picture of the confirmation of a grammar, it obscures 
the nature and interest of the grammarian's theory. 
The final section is devoted to what speakers know. It is 
brief. 
I. 
To start off  let us reflect on the notion of a grammar. 
What sort of  thing is a grammar? A grammar is an empirical 
theory about a particular language. Like any empirical theory, 
a grammar may be right or wrong. One of the goals of a 
grammar is to provide a specification of  the expressions which 
are grammatical sentences in the language. And one of the 
ways 'a  grammar can be wrong is to classify as grammatical a 
sentence which is not. Commonly the grammarian will present 
his theory in the form of a system of generative rules paired 
with a collection of definitions. Among the definitions, some 
may be thought to be universal, applicable in the grammar of  
every natural language; others will be idiosyncratic to the 
particular language at hand. The rules and definitions together 
serve (among other things) to pick out a class of  expressions, 
the "terminal language" of  the grammar. These are the expres- 
sions the grammar"genera tes ."  And it is these the grammar 
claims to be grammatical. The claim, of  course, is rarely 
explicitly stated. It goes without saying. But if a grammar can 
be wrong because it classifies as grammatical sentences which 
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are not, then it must entail that some sentences are gramma- 
tical. Thus the claim that all and only the sentences generated 
by the grammar are fully grammatical is an intrinsic, if tacit, 
part of  any grammatical theory. I f  we count the claim among 
the grammar 's  definitions, then "the definitions and rules 
entail a variety of  statements . . . .  o f  the form: S is a 
g r a m m a t i c a l  sentence. ' 'a So much is commonplace.  It 
pretends to be no more. 
II. 
A grammar is correct only if the sentences it holds to be 
grammatical actually are. With this there can be no quarrel. 
But what of  the notion of  grammaticality itself?. What is it for 
a sentence to be grammatical? Arbini, it seems, endorses a 
view which he takes to be "traditional (since about  1955)." 
,According to [the traditional] view being grammatical is 
simply a matter  of  being an expression . . .  which accords 
with the .intuitions of  competent  native speakers." (P. 76) 
"A grammar is a candidate for descriptive adequacy only if its 
output  is grammatical in the sense of  agreeing with the 
intuition of competent  speakers of  the relevant language." 
(P. 72). In the usage I adopt, a speaker's intuitions are the 
pre-theoretic judgements he makes about expressions. There is 
no evidence that Arbini would demur here. Now if "accord"  
is to be rendered as a bi-conditional supplemented by the 
subjunctive mood,  then a plausible reading of the traditional 
view is this: an expression is grammatical if and only if com- 
petent native speakers would judge it to be grammatical. But 
surely this will not do. For familiar generative grammars 
generate infinitely many sentences. Thus, for any natural 
number  n, all but a finite fragment of  the sentences a 
grammar classifies as grammatical contain more than n words. 
But as n becomes substantial, speakers'  intuitive judgements 
become q u i t e  useless. There is no saying how the average 
speaker would react to a sentence that  takes a year to utter. 
Yet if we take the "traditional view" quite literally, it seems 
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to require a grammar 's  pronouncements  to accord with the 
speaker's even in such outlandish cases. 
A more plausible account of  grammaticality is to be 
found in some of Chomsky 's  earlier w o r k )  Rather than 
r e q u i r i n g  that the grammar systematically capture the 
speaker 's  intuitions, it demands agreement between grammar  
and informant  only in the case of  relatively short  sentences 
about which speakers have generally consistent intuitions. The 
grammarian's  job is to find the simplest grammar that matches 
the speaker 's intuitions in simple cases. 3 In more complex 
cases the grammar itself is the arbiter of grammaticality. 4 
Agreeing with speakers'  judgements in simple cases is only a 
necessary condition for a grammar 's  correctness. A correct 
grammar must also accord with other sorts Of data and must 
mesh appropriately with a "linguistic theory"  or general 
theory of grammar. A detailed account of  these matters  is a 
long story, one which I have tried to tell elsewhere, s But the 
tale has a moral relevant to Prof. Arbini's dissent. Contrary to 
his "tradit ional" account, grammaticali ty cannot be defined 
directly by appeal to speakers'  intuitions. Rather, it is the 
notion of correct grammar that is central. A correct grammar 
of  a language is one which best hahdles the varied data avail- 
able to the linguist and which meets the contraints imposed 
by a general theory of grammar. "To  be grammatical is to be 
classified as grammatical by a correct grammar. ' '6 
I f  we  allow that grammaticali ty is most  plausibly expli- 
cated along the lines I have sketched, then we can, I think, 
revive the paradox Prof. Arbini would dismiss. It  is granted 
that speakers '  intuitive judgements about  expressions are 
among the grammarian 's  principal data. But what, precisely, is 
the speaker supposed to be judging? I f  he is judging that a 
proffered expression is a grammatical sentence in his language, 
then, granting our analysis of  grammaticality,  he is judging 
that the sentence would be classified as grammatical by a 
correct grammar of his language. But surely this is not the 
belief an informant  is expressing in reporting his linguistic 
intuitions. For a speaker is none the worse as an informant  
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though he be quite innocent of  the sophisticated notion of a 
correct grammar. What is more,  such a judgement  would appear 
to require the sort of  justification that can be provided only by 
the careful construction of  a grammar. So the informant,  
unless he moonlights as a grammarian, would be fobbing off  
judgements be cannot justify. I f  the informant  is not judging 
that a proposed sentence would be generated by a correct 
grammar of  his language, however, what is he doing when he 
offers his intuitions to the inquiring grammarian? This is the 
puzzle my account of  linguistic intuitions aims at untangling. 
III. 
A grammar is an empirical theory. I f  it is correct then it 
will accord with speakers'  intuitions, at least about  most  
relatively short sentences. This is a modest  claim about  what a 
correct grammar will do. I doubt  Arbini would disagree. There 
are, however, some things that, on my view, a correct 
grammar will not do. And here Arbini is less agreeable. 
Speakers of  a language have a variety of  skills which are 
foreign to non-speakers. With a bit o f  instruction a speaker of  
English, given a relatively brief declarative sentence, can 
provide its passive, or its negation, or can produce its asso- 
ciated yes-no question. An adequate grammar will specify 
which pairs of  sentences are related as active and passive, as 
simple declarative a n d  yes-no question, etc. It  will not, 
however, .tell us how to produce the passive of  a given active, 
nor the negation of  a given declarative. Arbini finds this a 
confusing doctrine. 
An example will serve to clarify matters. Consider a 
grammar after the pat tern of  Syntactic Structures. (The 
argument works as well for grammars in the Aspects mold.) 
Suppose we are given such a grammar and one of  its terminal 
sentences in the active voice. The problem posed: find the 
passive. To do it we must find the derivation of  the sentence. 
We then repeat the derivation step by step, except this time 
we apply the optional passive transformation at the appro- 
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priate point. The trick, of course, comes in the first step. For 
the task of  finding a derivation of  a given sentence is a 
non-trivial one and, more to our present point, it is not  
something the grammar tells us how to do. Given a grammar, 
there is a variety of  explicit procedures that might be 
specified to facilitate the search for a derivation of an arbi- 
trary string in the grammar's output. Among these search 
procedures, some will make explicit mention of  the rules of 
the grammar. Conceivably others would not. But it is no part 
of  a grammar to provide such a search procedure. And, as a 
bit of experimentation will reveal, constructing an efficient 
search procedure for a grammar of the modest complexity of 
Syntactic Structures is not a trivial-matter. Thus, although a 
grammar specifies which pairs of sentences are related as 
active and passive, it does not tell us how to produce the 
passive, given the active. 
There is an obvious anaology with other formal systems. 
An axiomatization of  the predicate calculus specifies which 
wffs are theorems. But it does not tell us how to produce a 
proof of  a given theorem, nor does it tell us how to deter- 
mine whether a given w f f  is a theorem. We can specify 
procedures for effecting the former task, but the specification 
is no part of the axiomatization of  the predicate calculus. 
Here we touch the issue of what speakers know, though 
only obliquely. If Fodor 's  views on tacit knowledge are 
accepted, then one of the explicit search procedures which 
specifies how to find the passive of a given active is to be 
counted as part of  a speaker's fund of tacit knowledge. 7 But, 
as we have seen, the rules which set out this procedure are 
not the rules of a grammar. So we may grant Fodor 's  doctine 
while yet denying that speakers know the rules of  their 
grammar. My argument on this score maintained to show no 
more. 8 
IV. 
There is a further point about the nature of  grammatical 
theory over which Arbini and I differ. The issue emerges only 
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diffusely in his critique, and it requires some coaxing of his 
words to bring it into focus. But I think it worth the risk of 
misreading him to bring the dispute to the fore, since the 
view I would reject, if not Arbini's, is widely held none- 
theless. And, by my lights, it poses a serious obstacle to a 
proper understanding of  the sort of theory a grammar is. 
"A speaker," Arbini writes, "knows how to produce the 
infinite number of sentences which comprise his native 
language. In fact, it is universally acknowledged among genera- 
tive grammarians that it is this fact which provides a basic 
theoretical constraint upon the descriptive adequacy of alter- 
native grammars of a given language." (P. 68) In view of 
this "basic constraint." Arbini is puzzled that my account of 
grammar focuses "only upon the ability to recognize such 
recondite theoretical properties as grammaticality, passivi- 
zation, NP identification, etc." (P. 68) For though he agrees 
"a speaker's competence also extends into these areas," 
(P. 68) he is troubled that in my portrait o f  the 
grammarian's doings "no at tempt is being made to account 
for what the grammarian regards as the most striking aspect 
of  his data, namely, the ability to produce (generate) the 
indefinitely many sentences of  a given language." (P. 70) 
At root, the dispute is over the role of  the speaker's ability to 
produce the sentences of  his language as data for the gram- 
marian's theory. We agree that speakers are able to produce 
(at least) a vast number of the sentences of  their native 
tongue. But on Arbini's view this fact is central to a gramma- 
rian's theorizing, while on mine it is largely irrelevant. 
The issue needs some sharpening. How, specifically, is the 
speaker's ability to produce the indefinitely many sentences 
of his language supposed to serve the grammarian as data? 
Perhaps the most plausible reply would run like this: "The 
grammarian is interested in constructing a theory which 
(among other things) entails that a sentence is grammatical if 
and only if it is. Thus he must discover which sentences are in 
fact grammatical. It is here that the speaker's ability to 
produce sentences is to serve as data. If a speaker produces a 
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given sentence, this is strong evidence that the sentence is 
grammatical." I f  our imagined respondant is judicious, he 
might add: " O f  course, the fact that  a speaker could produce 
a sentence is not  conclusive evidence that it is grammatical. 
Speakers may, on occasion, let pass an ungrammatical 
pronouncement .  But the grammarian should have weighty 
reasons before allowing his grammar to classify as ungramma- 
tica/ an utterance a native speaker has evidenced his ability to 
produce."  
The reply is reminiscent of  the account of  grammar once 
offered by Quine. 9 Its defects are the same. A native 
speaker 's ability to produce an utterance is no evidence for 
the ut terance 's  grammaticatity.  While speakers can produce a 
vast number  of  grammatical sentences, they also can (and 
sometimes do) produce all manner of  non, sentences ranging 
from almost grammatical slips of  the tongue, lost thoughts, 
and utterances thought  bet ter  of  half way through, to blatant 
examples of  meaningless noise. The fact that speakers Can 
produce such utterances, or that they do, is quite irrelevant to 
the ut terance 's  grammaticality.  Grammar  is not a mat ter  of  
what speakers can produce. Rather  is is the study of how 
they judge utterances. 1~ And it is for this reason that a 
speaker 's intuitions, his presystematic judgements, and not the 
utterances he can or does produce, are the principal data 
invoked by the grammarian. 
On my view, then, a grammar is quite literally a descrip- 
tion of  linguistic intuition. Grammar  is a corner of  psychology 
concerned to detail a speaker 's 'abi l i ty to "recognize recondite 
properties." But the interest o f  this geography of  linguistic 
intuition is not limited to those with a taste for the recondite. 
It  is obvious that grammatical sentences are not the only ones 
speakers produce or understand; linguistic communicat ion is 
not  carried on wholly within the bounds of the grammatical. 
Yet it is equally obvious that there are substantial overlaps 
between the class of  grammatical sequences and the class of  
sequences used in thought  and communication.  So there is 
reason to hope that an elaboration of  the  mechanisms which 
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account for linguistic intuition will shed light on the processes 
of producing and understanding utterances. Still, a grammar is 
only a modest first step. Exploration of the psychological 
mechanisms that account for the intuitions a grammar 
describes is largely unbegun. 
V. 
Having staked out my position on grammar, it is time to 
attend to what speakers know. Here Arbini and I are closer 
than might appear at first. For  he, it seems, is willing to 
admit what I took to be my most radical thesis. He grants 
that "a randomly selected informant clearly cannot be 
assumed to have long-standing beliefs about sentences which 
in all likelihood were unfamiliar to him until he was asked to 
pronounce upon their grammaticality." (P 61) It follows 
that before the speaker has considered a sentence he does not 
believe it is grammatical. And if he doesn't believe it, he 
doesn't know it. Such as my thesis. 
We are left with the problem of  saying just what the 
grammarian is studying when he investigates a speaker's 
linguistic intuitions. Some students of  language, albeit of  
questioned seriousness, have thought that the judgements 
about sentences and their parts offered by informants simply 
express part of  the knowledge speakers acquire in learning 
their language. B u t  this is incompatible with the thesis that 
Arbini and I share. My own solution is that informants are 
e x p r e s s i n g  newly  acquired knowledge about perceived 
similarities and dissimilarities among expressions. The gram- 
marian, then, is exploring the speaker's perceptual-cognitive 
capacity to acquire such knowledge on hearing or reflecting 
upon sentences. 
My agreement with Arbini extends further, for I would 
allow that the question of whether speakers know the rules of 
their grammar is, as Arbini insists, an empirical question. It 
might be, for example, that the psychological mechanisms 
accounting for speakers' linguistic intuitions are parallel to (or 
93 
STEPHEN P. STICH 
even identical with) the mechanisms that underlie our propo- 
sitional beliefs and knowledge. Should this prove to be the 
case, it would be a powerful argument that, despite the 
dissimilarities between the relation of speaker to grammar and 
the relation of believer to belief in more standard cases, still 
the former relation ought to be considered a species of belief 
(or knowledge). Such a discovery of parallel psychological 
mechanisms would be a paradigm of  the extenuating circum- 
stance which, on my account, would justify attributing 
k n o w l e d g e  of  grammar to speakers. Other extenuating 
circumstances might be imagined. To date, however, all such 
extenuating circumstances must be imagined. None, as best I 
can tell, has been discovered. We know neither the mechanism 
underlying intuition, nor the mechanism underlying belief, nor 
have we any reason to think them identical. 
Paradoxically, Arbini and others who would attribute 
knowledge of  the rules of  a grammar to speakers do not 
always treat the attribution as an empirical conclusion. Thus, 
Arabini writes: "The relevant account of  knowledge occurs in 
the a t tempt  to explain how the appropriate properties come 
to be a t t r ibu ted  to the data in question in terms of what the 
speaker must be presumed to know if he is to process this 
data." (P. 63; emphasis added) The "da ta"  in question are 
newly confronted sentences; the properties are grammaticality,  
being related as active and passive, etc. So for Arbini, the 
speaker "'must be presumed to know"  his grammar if we are 
to explain how he attributes various grammatical properties to 
sentences. But why must he be presumed to know anything? 
I t  is granted that the speaker makes such attributions and that 
there is some mechanism or other which explains how he 
comes t o  make them. But we do not know what this mecha- 
nism is. To stipulate that the explanation of intuitions must 
be in terms of a speaker's knowledge of  grammar (or of 
anything else) is to settle an empirical question by fiat. 
It  is for similar reasons that I would challenge Chomsky 's  
characterization of grammar as the study of competence,  
where competence is " the speaker-bearer's knowledge of  his 
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language." On presentely available evidence there is little 
reason to think tla'e relation between a speaker and his 
grammar is knowledge. The disanalogies between this relation 
and more standard cases of  knowledge are patent. To be sure, 
less obvious analogies may be discovered. But Chornsky's 
characterization of  grammar as the study of competence 
would seem to settle by definition what is in fact an empirical 
question. 
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